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Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals? 
 
Abstract 
While European Union (EU) citizenship has been traditionally key to limiting criminalisation at national 
level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, 
and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of 
Justice in its case-law, where crimes show the offender disregard for the societal values of the host 
Member States, and deny her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serve to legitimate 
criminal law. The Court outlines two – counter-posing - types of human being: the law-abiding citizen 
and the criminal. On that ground, the CJEU delineates a model of probationary citizenship directed 
towards the protection of the former category from the latter. The article shows the legal unsoundness 
of the Court’s approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case-law over a crime-citizenship 
spectrum, marked at its opposite ends by Duff’s communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one 
hand, and Jakobs’ criminal law of the enemy, on the other.  
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last years, the debate on rights and duties in European Union (EU) citizenship has fiercely 
revamped.1 The outburst of the economic crisis has brought about a manifold and widespread attitude 
of closure and wariness, on part of Member of States, towards non-nationals. Scholars have identified 
continuity of such evolution in a wider trend of un-freedomisation that started especially as a reaction 
to 11 September.2   
In this context, thorny questions have arisen as to what to make of foreigners – and in particular Union 
citizens – that have committed a crime in the Member State where they are based. 
Union law has seen crime and criminal convictions slowly emerging as a criterion to allocate (or deny) 
rights and distinguish between the good and the bad citizen. A number of cases have been brought to 
the attention of the EU Court of Justice (‘CJEU’ or ‘the Court’). In these decisions, the Court regarded 
wrongdoings as a signifier of the offender’s disregard for societal values and lack of integration. Such 
an approach explicitly looks at integration as a requirement for granting citizenship rights; integration 
which is, in turn, denied per se by criminal behaviour.  
Thereby, crime has become a sufficient reason on its own to deny citizenship rights (mainly, right to 
residence and protection against the expulsion). Scholars have referred to such a strongly value-based 
argumentative patter as a normative turn in the Union discourse.3 Along similar lines, Stephen Coutts 
                                                     
1 R. Bellamy, ‘A Duty-Free Europe? What’s Wrong with Kochenov’s Account of EU Citizenship Rights’, European Law Review 21, no. 4 (2015): 558–65; D. Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship 
without Duties’, European Law Journal 20, no. 4 (2014): 482–98; Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship’, Common 
Market Law Review 52, no. 4 (2015): 889–937. 
2 C. Gearty, ‘The State of Freedom in Europe’, (21) 6 (2015) European Law Journal, pp. 706–721. 
3 S. Barbou des Places, ‘The Integrated Person in EU Law’ in L. Azoulai, S. Barbou des Places, E. Pataut, eds., Constructing the Person in EU Law. Rights, Roles, Identities (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2016), 186 onwards. 
has traced back the Court’s decisions to a retributive stance, and in particular to Anthony Duff’s 
communitarian approach to criminal law.4 The CJEU’s application of the latter approach to cases of 
Union citizenship would be directed toward the establishment of a community of values within the EU. 
The CJEU would be using criminal law and public security to strengthen ‘the substance of Union 
citizenship by complementing the rights of the Directive with correlative obligations’.5  
This paper challenges that vision, and argues that the Luxembourg judges point to the opposite direction. 
It is submitted that the Court resorts to citizenship to strengthen the legitimacy of (in particular, EU) 
criminal law. It does so by outlining a model of probationary citizenship, built upon presumptive 
mechanisms and the use of abstract category such as ‘crime’ and ‘the criminal’. With the protection of 
the law-abiding citizen from the dangerous individual in mind – embodied by a broad interpretation of 
public security - the Court allocates or restrict rights on the basis of individuals’ criminal record. 
Therefore, the article analyses the Court’s case-law beyond the logic of rights restriction or obligation 
imposed. It offers a different perspective to the existing debate, by revealing a paradigmatic shift in the 
Court’s approach. To do so, the rulings are not merely understood and assessed as cases on the limits 
on citizenship rights. Rather, the approach of this research brings to the fore the deeper understanding 
of the role for criminal law and the criminal embraced by the CJEU. Furthermore, it connects this 
evolution to a broader redefinition of the Court’s understanding of citizenship, where anthropological 
models are opposed and divided by the very thin line of integration: the economically active, the law-
abiding, on the one hand; the unemployed, the criminal, on the other.  
In order to test the hypothesis, the article discusses the case-law of the CJEU on crime and citizenship 
following the Tsakouridis judgment through the lens of punishment theory.6 The materials have been 
selected by researching rulings including both the terms ‘crime’, or ‘criminal law’, and ‘citizenship’, 
through the database of the CJEU. Then the analysis focused on cases where the Court had to decide 
whether or not conferring EU citizenship rights upon a person with criminal record. As a result, the 
materials mainly revolve around interpretation of Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, such as Articles 
18 and 21 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), and Directive 2004/38/EC (or ‘Citizenship 
Directive’).7  
The article focuses on the decisions issued following the Tsakouridis case, the latter constituting a 
turning point in the Court’s approach to crime and citizenship. Historically, free movement of goods8 
and persons9 has been key to limiting over-criminalisation at national level and expanding individual 
                                                     
4 Stephen Coutts, ‘Union Citizenship as Probationary Citizenship: “Onuekwere”’, Common Market Law Review 52, no. 2 (2015): 531–45. 
5 L. Azoulai and S. Coutts, ‘Restricting Union Citizens’ Residence Rights on Grounds of Public Security. Where Union Citizenship and the AFSJ Meet: P.I.’, Common Market Law Review 
50, no. 2 (2013): 553–70; Kochenov and Pirker, ‘Deporting the Citizens within the European Union’, 569. 
6 Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis [2010] I-11979. 
7 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004L 158/ 77. 
8 Case C- 41-76, Suzanne Criel, née Donckerwolcke and Henri Schou v Procureur de la République au tribunal de grande instance de Lille and Director General of Customs [1976] ECR 
01921; Case C-299/86, criminal proceedings against Rainer Drexl [1988] ECR 01213; Case C-276/91, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1993] ECR I-04413; 
Case C-95/01, criminal proceedings against John Greenham and Léonard Abel, [2004] ECR I-01333. 
9 Case C-193/94, criminal proceedings against Sofia Skanavi and Konstantin Chryssanthakopoulos [1996] ECR I-00929; Case C-16/78, criminal proceedings against Michel Choquet 
[1978] ECR 2293, para 4; Case C-265/88 criminal proceedings against Lothar Messner [1989] ECR 4209, para 14; Case C-243/01, criminal proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli and 
rights.10 Granted, this has not excluded restrictions based on public policy11 or public security.12 
However, the case-law of the CJEU over the years has played a major role in setting limits to those 
restrictions13 in a way that has been largely translated into the Citizenship Directive. Starting with 
Tsakouridis, the Court’s understanding of the relationship between criminal conducts and citizenship 
has radically changed, with public security often being resorted to as a tool to justify serious restrictions 
of individual rights.  
With the view to understanding and discussing the decisive rationale underpinning the CJEU’s stance 
on the use of criminal law within the EU, the materials are discussed through the lens of punishment 
theory. Strictly understood, the Court judgments are not properly concerned with criminal punishment, 
but with the denial of rights following criminal convictions. However, the discussed rulings are traced 
back to punishment theory by a holistic understanding of punishment. In particular, the article relies on 
Dolinko’s approach, according to which the core practice of punishment can be regarded as ‘the 
imposition of consequences generally believed to be painful or burdensome on someone found to have 
violated the law, as a condemnatory response to that violation, by person vested with legal authority to 
impose these consequences’.14  
With that in mind, the article places the Court’s case-law within the broader context of the purposes of 
punishment recognised in the law and constitutional traditions of member states, and the EU itself: 
general deterrence, specific deterrence (incapacitation and, especially, reintegration), retribution. While 
general deterrence is not decisive to the present discussion, the analysis focuses on specific deterrence 
and retribution.  
The assessment of the case-law is carried out by envisaging the relationship between crime and 
citizenship rights as a spectrum (hereinafter ‘crime-citizenship spectrum’) consisting of different 
approaches: at its ends, the articles poses the communitarian, inclusive account of Duff, and the Jakobs’ 
distinction between the criminal law of the citizen and the criminal of the enemy, respectively. Upon 
marking the boundaries of the spectrum, such theoretical frameworks are not regarded as sole and 
mutually exclusive alternatives. Quite the contrary, they are used to locate the Court’s stance over such 
a spectrum – where retribution is just one of the possible purposes of criminal penalties - and identify 
shortcomings in the CJEU’s case-law.   
                                                     
Others [2003] ECR I-13031; Joined cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C-360/04, criminal proceedings against Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese and Angelo Sorricchio [2007] ECR 
I-01891; Case C-5/83, criminal proceedings against H.G. Rienks. [1983] ECR 4233; Case C-186/87, Ian William Cowan v Trésor public, [1989] ECR 00195. 
10 As for pre-Maastricht citizenship, see in particular D. Kochenov and Sir R. Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty 
Text’, European Law Review 37, no. 4 (2012).  
11 Case 41-74, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, [1974] ECR 01337; Case C-34/79, Regina v Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby [1979] ECR 03795; Case C-137/09, 
Marc Michel Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht [2010] ECR I-13019 
12 Case C-83/94, criminal proceedings against Peter Leifer, Reinhold Otto Krauskopf and Otto Holzer [1995] ECR I-03231.  
13 See among many Case C-36/75, Roland Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur, [1975] ECR 01219; Case C-348/96, criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa. [1999] ECR I-11; Case C-
459/99, Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v Belgian State, [2002] ECR I-06591; Joined cases Georgios Orfanopoulos and Others (C-482/01) 
and Raffaele Oliveri (C-493/01) v Land Baden-Württemberg, [2004] ECR I-05257. 
14 Dolinko, Punishment, 405. The account has its starting point the Hart’s approach, supplemented by the reprobation element put forward by Feinberg. See Hart, Ibid, 5; J. Feinberg, Doing 
and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 
The article shows the following. Firstly, the Court overlook the drawbacks that expulsion measures – 
and denial of rights broadly – could have on the reintegration of the person concerned. This is so despite 
its tentative references to the importance of taking into account the reintegration purposes of custodial 
penalties. Secondly, and relatedly, the oblivescence of the reintegration purpose patently denies the 
Court’s communitarian approach to criminal law. Rather, it is submitted that the Court envisages a 
model of probationary citizenship, where the strong stress on security causes a steer towards an 
understanding of the criminal as a threat. As shown below, allocating rights according to the 
anthropological divide citizen v criminal can prove contradictory and unrealistic, so making EU 
citizenship significantly weaker. Thirdly, it highlights the strong link emerging between EU citizenship 
and EU criminal law, with the former being used to legitimate Union’s competences in the latter area.  
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, the methodology (2.1.) and the materials (2.2.) are 
discussed. Firstly, the broader approach to European integration in criminal law and citizenship is 
briefly introduced (2.1.1.). Secondly, the focus moves on to retributivist theories of criminal law - and 
Duff’s communitarian approach in particular - on the one hand (2.1.2), and Jakobs’ distinction between 
criminal law of the citizen and criminal law of the enemy, on the other (2.1.3.). Thirdly, the main 
scenario of this research (Court’s case-law on crime and citizenship rights) is explained and justified 
(2.2.).  
Section 3 deals with the research results and the discussion. After presenting the judgments relevant to 
this paper (3.1.), the Court’s approach is placed at a point over the spectrum more leaning towards the 
Jakobs’ account (3.2.). Leaning towards must not be understood as overlapping with the criminal law 
of the enemy, as the latter often finds expression through preventive measures. 
The conclusions (4) confirm the main hypothesis of the article: in spite of the – apparently – morals-
centred approach, the Court understanding of the relationship between crime and citizenship is mainly 
concerned with security and legitimacy of EU criminal law, built upon an understanding of the criminal 
as a threat. The discussion shows that the CJEU’s stance is hardly compatible with EU citizenship law, 
and carries the seeds of an authoritarian view of the wrongdoer.  
 
2. Connecting the Dots. EU Citizenship and Crime 
2.1. The Theoretical Framework 
2.1.1. European Integration in Citizenship 
The crime-citizenship spectrum is to be placed in the broader framework of EU citizenship. The legal 
approach usually regards citizenship as a combination of two elements.15 On the one hand citizenship 
                                                     
15 D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship And The Difficult Relationship Between Status And Rights’, Columbia Journal of European Law 15, no. 2 (2009). 
as a status, linking the state to its citizens. On the other, citizenship as bearer of a complex of rights 
enjoyed by citizens.16  
As know, the very core of EU citizenship is the right, for Union nationals, to move and reside freely 
within the EU regardless of their nationality,17 and without requiring links to the performance of an 
economic activity.18 The Citizenship Directive gives substance to this right mainly through residence 
security, namely the right to enter and stay permanently in the territory of another member state.19 The 
Directive does so by regarding the right to residence and the protection against expulsion as means of, 
rather than (only) a reward for, integration. Secondly, with specific regard to the use of coercive 
measures: they cannot be triggered only by criminal record; they require a case-by-case assessment of 
the seriousness of the threat embodied by the person concerned.20 While these principles are stated in 
the specific context of expulsion from the host state,21 they convey the idea of EU citizenship as sitting 
at odds with abstract categories without any anchors to reality.  
The Court’s case-law on rights and crime relationship discussed here is part of a broader trend. As in 
other controversial areas – such as equal treatment in access to social benefits – the Court has redefined 
its traditional approach to the relationship between citizenship rights, on the one hand, and limits and 
conditions, on the other. As conditions and limits are reversed as instances of obligations or 
responsibility,22 personal integration -  resting on quantitative, territorial and qualitative elements – into 
the host society emerges as the overriding duty and the decisive criterion for allocating rights. By 
subjecting the acquisition and maintaining of rights to a never-ending integration test, the Court outlines 
a model of probationary citizenship where ideal types of individuals are opposed and divided by a thin 
line: on the one hand the good, economically active, law-abiding citizen; on the other, the bad, 
unemployed, wrongdoer.  
Equal access to social benefits in the host state is a case in point for the emergence of these counter-
posed characters in the new EU citizenship narrative: the self-sufficient v the economically inactive. In 
Dano, the Court found that non-discrimination applies only if the person’s residence in the territory of 
the host Member State complies with the conditions of the Citizenship Directive – namely, being 
                                                     
16 However Ibid., the author found that the relationship between status and rights may be flexible, and another distinction is possible to be drawn between “ ‘formal’ citizenship, resting on 
the status, and ‘informal’ citizenship, emphasising the importance of the possibility of enjoying citizenship rights as opposed to the importance of possessing the formal legal status of a 
citizen”.  
17 Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, [2002] ECR 6191, para 28; Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; Case C-138/02, Collins, [2004] ECR I-2703, para 61 onwards. 
18 A link established by the Court of Justice, and currently codified in Articles 18, 20 and 21 of the TFEU . See Case C-76/05, Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849, para 89; Grzelczyk, para 36-37; 
Case C-413/99, Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-7091, para 81. See also J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism’, EUI Working Papers 
RSCAS 2010/60, 2010, 9 onwards. 
19 As Kochenov argued, ‘Residence security is at the core of what the essential legal essence of the citizenship status is now about’, which also explains why (even the mere possibility of) 
being deported and expelled ‘play(s) an essential role in outlining with clarity the scope of those who are citizens of a polity, as opposed to merely residents’. D. Kochenov and B. Pirker, 
‘Deporting the Citizens within the European Union: A Counter-Intuitive Trend in Case C-348/09, PI V Oberburgermeisterin Der Stadt Remscheid’, Colum. J. Eur. L. 19, no. 2 (2012): 369.  
For a brilliant analysis of EU citizenship and the territory, see Loïc Azoulai, ‘The (mis) Construction of the European Individual: Two Essays on Union Citizenship Law’, EUI Department 
of Law Research Paper, no. 2014/14 (2014). 
20 Article 27(2). 
21 Article 28(2) stipulates that those Union citizens (or their family members) who have the right of permanent residence in the host Member State, may be subject to an expulsion 
measure so long as there are serious grounds of public policy or public security. Article 28(3)(a), precludes the expulsion of Union citizens who have resided in the host Member State for 
the previous ten years, unless imperative grounds of public security, as defined by Member States and subject to compliance with EU law, justify the measure. 
22 Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending’, 900 onwards. 
economically active or self-sufficient.23 In Alimanovic, this process of abstraction is further 
strengthened. As the Directive establishes ‘a gradual system as regards the retention of the status of 
worker which seeks to safeguard the right of residence and access to social assistance’, the need for an 
individual assessment of the specific circumstances of the person concerned is dismissed.24 Consistently 
with its approach on crime and citizenship rights, the Court ‘shift[s] away from equal rights as a means 
for integration, towards an output-oriented assessment that links citizens’ rights to the degree of 
integration’.25 
The new approach of the Court is based on a high level of abstraction, whereby the depiction of 
anthropological models of citizens is combined to the refusal to apply any proportional test. 
The residence-worthiness test is the barycentre of the Court’s new understanding, based on factors such 
as the level of income or loyalty to the law. To this end, the commission of criminal conducts raise 
thorny questions: above all, is the wrongdoing – and, if so, to what extent - capable of affecting the 
personal integration link between the offender and the host state? This process of departure from the 
wording and the rationale of citizenship law is strengthened by the construction of a broad concept of 
public security through the identification of dangerous categories of individual.  
In next two paragraphs, the paper presents the two main approaches used to analyse the Court’s stance, 
and places them in the context of the relationship between crime and EU citizenship. 
 
2.1.2. Retribution and Duff’s Communitarism 
Consequentialism and retributivism constitute the two main approaches to punishment theory.26 On the 
one hand, consequentialist accounts justify punishment by its (desirable) consequences:27 normative 
validation and deterrence,28 be it general (deterring others from committing crimes) or specific 
(deterring individuals from reoffending through incapacitation or rehabilitation).29 On the other,  
retributivism30 sees punishment as an intrinsically good response to criminal behaviour, and seeks the 
                                                     
23 Case C‑333/13, Dano, para 69. 
24 Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, paras 59-60. 
25 D. Thym, 'The elusive limits of solidarity: Residence rights of and social benefits for economically inactive Union citizens', Common Market Law Review, 2015, 52(1), 39. 
26 However, authors argued that “The labels ‘consequentialist’ and ‘retributive’ are of increasingly little use as the theories that they are meant to group together have become so diverse.” 
M. Matravers, Justice and Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 4. 
27 As foundational works for consequentialist accounts, see C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (Milano, Feltrinelli, 2014) and J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation (Birmingham: Legal Classic Library, 1986). Even the term ‘consequentialism’ can be approached from more than one perspective. It was firstly introduced by G. E. M. Anscombe, 
‘Modern Moral Philosphy’, Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 12. On the one hand, it has been used interchangeably with utilitarianism. On the other, utilitarianism refers to one particular 
variety of consequentialism.. 
28 Dolinko, ‘Punishment’, 406. 
29 M. C. Materni, ‘Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice’, British Journal of American Legal Studies 2 (2013): 290 onwards. See J. Andenas, ‘The General Preventive Effects of 
Punishment’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 114, no. 7 (1966): 949. Broadly, one can see how rehabilitation is meant ‘to reintegrate the offender into society after a period of 
punishment’, whereas incapacitation takes place by locking up the allegedly dangerous individual up. See B. Hudson, Understanding Justice (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003), 
26; See A. M. Dershowitz, ‘Background Paper’, in Fair and Certain Punishment: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1976). 
30 J. M. Cottingham, ‘Varieties of Retribution’, Philosophical Quarterly 29, no. 116 (1979): 238–246. These can go from the unfair advantage that the offender would derive from the crime, 
M. Davis To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, (Boulder: Westview, 1992); to the need for ‘teaching the wrongdoer that the action she did […] is morally wrong, J. Hampton, ‘The Moral 
Education Theory of Punishment’,  Phil. & Pub. Affairs 13, no. 3 (1984): 208–238; for permitting ‘purgation of guilt’, H. Morris, ‘A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment’, American 
Philosophical Quarterly 18, no.4 (1981): 263–271; or, for respecting and addressing the criminal as a rational moral agent seeking ‘his participation’, R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
punishment that the society has a right to inflict and the criminal a right to demand.31 Its goal is not 
mere deterrence, but providing actual and potential offenders with moral reasons for freely choosing 
not to offend.  
Mixed approaches to punishment are espoused by member states of the Union, where reintegration is 
part and parcel of their constitutional traditions and balance the retribution inherent in the imposition of 
criminal penalties.32 The same goes for different authors, who have tried over to outline theories 
including elements of both retributivism and consequentialism. 
Duff’s account is a paradigmatic example in this respect, as he conceives of punishment as a way to 
bring the offender ‘to repent his crime; to accept his punishment as an appropriate vehicle for his 
repentance; and thus to reform himself’ (emphasis added).33 Criminal law has the function to select 
what wrongs should be ‘public’, so making the author publicly accountable. Therefore, ‘criminal law is 
focused on the polity’s formal response to the conducts with which it deals with’34. The legitimacy of 
criminal law relies on the existence of an inclusive political community,35 which should deal 
collectively with the wrong in order to ‘preserve rather than deny the offender’s civic standing’. He 
looks at a model of republican citizenship, ‘understood as equal and mutually respectful participation 
in the civic enterprise’36, without being used as a tool to distinguish the law-abiding from the enemy. 
Against that background, criminal law should not be oriented to incapacitation. Non-citizens are not 
disregarded in Duff’s approach to punishment: temporary visitors or residents should be accorded ‘the 
respect and concern that is due to guests who are both bound and protected by the values that define the 
polity’.37 
Duff has explicitly the state community in mind,38 so that a transposition of his account as it is to the 
Union level would be inaccurate. The main reason is that the homogeneity of the EU as community of 
values is inferior to that of member states. A Union-wide Duffian approach to citizenship and criminal 
law would see the latter as a means of (re)inclusion of the person in the society where s/he lives. The 
‘collectively dealing with the wrong’ is not – only - cooperation between authorities to coercively move 
the offender from one state to the other; or, in other words, allowing the host state get rid of the source 
of disturbance. Quite the contrary, making a person publicly accountable for his/her behaviour means, 
for a state, taking charge of that person, and reaffirming his/her existence as part of that community. 
Furthermore, a Duffian approach would reject any counter-position between abstract models of human 
being (the citizen v the criminal), as well as automatisms between offences and rights restriction. Since 
                                                     
31 J. G. Murphy, ‘Retributivism and the State's Interest in Punishment’, Nomos 27 (1985): 158-9. 
32 While general deterrence is usually associated to and pursued through the abstract threat of penalty established by the law, reintegration and retribution are particularly relevant to the 
present discussion. For an analysis of the controversial use of reintegration at EU law level, see L. Mancano, ‘The Place for Prisoners in EU Law?’, European Public Law, 22, no. 4 (2016): 
717-747. 
33 See Dolinko, Punishment, 421. A. Duff, Trials and Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 260. 
34 Duff, ‘Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law’. 
35 ‘Since the criminal law is part of the apparatus of the state, […] the criminal law's community must be a polity’. Duff, ‘Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law’, 138. 
36 Duff, ‘A Criminal Law for Citizens’, 300 onwards. 
37 Duff also refers to responsible citizen, where the wrongdoer ‘answers to his fellow members of the community for his alleged breaches of that law’. See R. A. Duff, ‘Law, Language and 
Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal Liability’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 18, no. 2 (June 1998): 189–206. 
38 R. A. Duff, ‘A Criminal Law for Citizens’, Theoretical Criminology 14, no. 3 (1 August 2010): 293–309.  
the punishment against the wrongdoer is underpinned by an underlying political community, the 
response to the unlawful conduct cannot only result in doing away with the person in one state.  
The traditional understanding of EU citizenship and crime is not one where the offender is – nearly - 
automatically refused or withdrawn rights, and physically removed from the territory of the host state. 
However, when the Court states – as it does in one of the cases discussed below - that the commission 
of a crime denies integration tout court, it is depersonalising the citizen. It is turning the person who 
has committed a crime into the criminal. If crime precludes integration, in certain cases it erases the 
integration link already established. The detrimental effect on reintegration caused by expulsion, denial 
or withdrawal of rights, is not relevant: in the absence of integration (denied by the offence), there is no 
reintegration to purse. The host states are places where non-nationals (but still EU citizens) are living 
oxymora: they are perpetually temporary visitor.  
 
2.1.3.  The Criminal Law of the Enemy and Citizenship Rights 
Duff’s account can be placed at the end of the crime-citizenship spectrum, where citizenship underpins 
an inclusive understanding of criminal law - the ‘dealing collectively with the wrong’. At the other end, 
one finds the Jakobs’ distinction between the criminal law of the citizen and the criminal law of the 
enemy.  
According to Jakobs,39 criminal law and punishment have a fundamental communicative function: 
guaranteeing normative expectations of the society. Punishment communicates that that conduct is 
prohibited, and reaffirms that the violated rule is still valid. The citizens’ criminal law communicates 
that that conduct is not permitted. In spite of the wrongdoing, the individual is still regarded as a person. 
The enemy criminal law addresses who can be no longer considered a law-abiding citizen, but rather a 
threat to society. It looks at particular areas of crime (sexual offences, drug trafficking, terrorism) and 
takes mainly the form of preventive measures, high imprisonment terms, diluted procedural rights.  
Jakobs firmly states that citizens’ criminal law must be kept separately from enemy criminal law, so 
upholding the sharp contrast between the loyal citizen, on the one hand, and the deviant enemy, on the 
other. This nonetheless, scholars found that ‘To the extent that the State uses enemy criminal law to 
secure citizen criminal law it risks the whole existence of the latter’.40  
Jakobs’ distinction has been associated to the model of probationary citizenship, where such a status is 
used as a means to the end of reaffirming national security.41 Zedner noted that ‘Citizenship is asserted 
[…] as central to the policing of those irregular citizens who, though already resident, are deemed to 
stand outside civil society’.42 The probationary citizenship amounts to a perpetual ‘Damocle’s sword’, 
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hanging on the head of the visitors, as well as the citizen: it works as a reward, rather than a tool of 
political integration. 
Symptoms of this approach have emerged in EU law over the years. The tendency to counterpose the 
law-abiding citizen to the criminal43 is accompanied by the demands for protection of the former class 
of individuals and the public more in general, as well as by war declarations against serious areas of 
crime (most commonly drugs, sexual offenses, and terrorism).44 The tendency in EU substantive 
criminal law to go ‘to war at crimes’ has been identified as part and parcel of the EU legislature at 
large.45 This is reflected in policy documents such as the Tampere Council, where the application of 
mutual recognition to criminal law is linked to the safe exercise of free movement by Union citizens. 
In secondary EU law, the FDs on (1) the transfer of prisoners and (2) the mutual recognition of probation 
measures establish a system of transfer of the convicted person from the state where they have been 
convicted to the one where they have higher chances of reintegration. The former instrument removes 
the consent of the person to the transfer in a number of cases, one being that s/he was delivered an 
expulsion measure in the state from which s/he will be transferred. The latter sees the protection of the 
public as one of its key objectives. There is then a clearly super-individual dimension of reintegration, 
where the person is somehow regarded as an objective for the purposes of public security. The role for 
the individual is shrunk proportionately to the presence of signs of dangerousness: an expulsion measure 
removes the need for consent of the individual to the transfer.  
How does this relate to the relationship between crime and EU citizenship rights? The Court’s 
understanding departs from the establishment of a community of values through criminal law, and 
builds a probationary citizenship upon the following centrepieces. The centre of gravity is an enlarged 
and debatable concept of public security, mainly construed through categorisation of dangerous 
individuals. The Court identified groups of people (sexual offenders, drug dealers, terrorists) that are 
per se a threat to public safety, and are therefore worth being expelled by the host member state – or the 
Union at large. We see therefore an inverse correlation between the reduced role for individual 
assessment, on the one hand, and the increased level of abstraction, on the other. This conceptual 
apparatus is used to allow member states deny EU citizens protection against the expulsion, as 
recognised in the Citizenship Directive.  
However, such dynamic takes place on a larger scale as well, where the broader issue of crime and 
citizenship rights is at stake. Crime as such denies integration and shows disregard for societal values 
of the host society. Two abstract categories of human beings are counter-posed (the criminal and the 
law-abiding); individuals are placed in either of them, and rewarded with or denied rights accordingly, 
depending on their level of obedience to the law. What is more, the Court tries to corroborate the 
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equation by reference to EU criminal law. The fact that the fight against certain crimes is covered by 
primary and secondary EU law further legitimates a restrictive approach. 
Against the background, the collectively dealing with the wrong is out of the picture. The AG refers to 
reintegration as a general principle of EU law, though from a super-individual perspective: since these 
persons will come back to society one day, reintegration is key to the fight against crime. Reintegration, 
however, is very tentatively part of the Court’s vocabulary. What about the detrimental impact of 
expulsion from the state where the person has been living for over 10 years? The Court seems not to be 
particularly concerned: regardless of the time they have spent in the host member state, these persons 
are, and remain, guests on trial.  
 
2.2.  Introduction of the Scenario 
This research discusses the Court’s stance on crime and citizenship rights. The main argument is that 
the CJEU’s approach leans towards a model of probationary citizenship, which resembles in some 
features Jakobs’ distinction between the criminal law of the citizen and the criminal law of the enemy. 
The research analyses the Court’s rulings on crime and citizenship following the Tsakouridis case 
through punishment theory. The latter ruling has been taken as a starting point, since it expresses a clear 
change in the CJEU’s understanding of the relationship between wrongdoings and citizenship rights.  
The materials are analysed through the lens of punishment theory. To this end, this article adopts a 
holistic understanding of punishment, regarded as the reprobationary response whereby the EU reacts 
to criminal law violations. Therefore, the discussion revolves around the way in which criminal 
punishment affects rights (be they already acquired or not) that are not inherently curtailed by penal 
sanctions (such as the right to liberty).  
As punishment theories are concerned with the legitimacy of punishment, they can prove to be an 
important tool to investigate into the foundation of the Court’s approach to crime and citizenship rights 
restriction. Citizenship and punishment in the Union approach are highly interdependent. On the one 
hand, there is the issue as to whether rights are regarded as vehicle of, or reward for, integration. On the 
other, if integration is a prerequisite for acquiring and maintaining rights, the consequences a polity 
attaches to punishment can change dramatically the position of the citizen.  
The Court has traditionally been adamant that curtailing EU citizenship rights for deterrence purposes 
is incompatible with EU law, and that the impact of wrongdoings on citizenship rights must reflect the 
blameworthiness of the latter.  
The presentation of the Tsakouridis,46 P. I.,47 Onuekwere,48 M. G.,49 C. S.50 and Rendón Marín51 cases 
reveals a new role for crime in the Union. These rulings regard different situations: Tsakouridis and P. 
I. are concerned with expulsion from a Member State to another; Onuekwere and M. G. raise the 
question as to whether time spent in prison can be considered for acquiring the right to permanent 
residence or protection against expulsion in the host Member State; Rendón Marín and C. S. deal with 
the expulsion due to criminal convictions, from the Union altogether, of a third-country national having 
full custody of EU citizens.  
Such variance notwithstanding, these judgments are part and parcel of the broader Court’s 
understanding of citizenship. They legitimate the use of criminal law and coercive measures through a 
model of probationary citizenship, which opposes the good citizen (the law-abiding one) to the bad 
citizen: the latter is the criminal, monolithic category of individual who, as such, is not worth trust and 
legal protection in the envisaged by the Court. Upon that model, the Court develops a debatable concept 
of public security, which in turn allows the expulsion of the offender from the host state or – in 
exceptional circumstances - the Union itself, even when minors are involved. Public security is 
constructed by categorisation of dangerous groups of individuals: terrorist, drug traffickers, child 
abusers. Where a person is attracted in one of the categories of ‘monstrous’ individuals identified, s/he 
turns into a threat to public security who is to be removed from the territory.  
The real value upheld by the Court are not the morals of the host society, but the individual obedience 
to the law.52 Depicting categories such as the criminal and the crime, without nuances, is unrealistic and 
hardly compatible with EU citizenship law (including the traditional approach of the Court). Firstly, 
placing every crime on the same level means completely ignoring what criminal law comes down to: 
namely, inflicting punishment (in the holistic sense hereby adopted) depending on the seriousness of 
the obligation/prohibition violated. Secondly, and relatedly, this abstraction process contradicts the link 
between rights deprivation and individual assessment clearly established by EU law. Thirdly, and in 
further contradiction with citizenship law, the role of rights as (also) a tool of integration is completely 
kept out of sight: not only crimes deny integration, they also preclude any further attempt at achieving 
it. Fourthly, the impact of these measures on the reintegration of the person concerned is set aside.  
They try not to establish values commonality through criminal law. They reinforce an understanding of 
‘the fundamental status’ of Union nationals as permanent temporary hosts, rather that wide EU citizens.  
 
3. Crime and Punishment in EU Citizenship  
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3.1. Retribution and Allocation of Rights in EU Citizenship 
Two levels of discussion are to be kept separately: the broader issue of the impact of criminal behaviour 
on citizenship rights; the specific case of rights restriction based on public policy and public security, 
and the interpretation thereof. The commission of a crime might well lead to 
denial/restriction/withdrawal of rights, without necessarily resulting in expulsion measures.  
However, both areas of analysis show the broader understanding of Union citizenship currently 
espoused by the CJEU. Historically, the Court has not been prone to passively accept restrictions to free 
movement posed by Member States merely as consequence of criminal behaviour. Rather, it has looked 
at the substance of the conduct and the proportionality between the latter and the resulting limitation. 
EU law subjects the adoption of coercive measures to the presence of an actual and present threat53 to 
public policy (understood as a fundamental interest of the society)54 or - the stricter test of -  public 
security (internal and external security of the state).55 The existence of previous criminal convictions is 
relevant insofar as the latter are symptoms of the threat as mentioned above.56 Furthermore, the 
requirement for individual assessment continues even once the coercive measure has been adopted.57 
These constraints reveal the wariness towards any kinds of automatism and abstraction,58 with the Court 
being the vigilant over member states’ use of criminal law to restrict citizenship rights. 
In a similar way to what happens in other contexts of EU citizenship such as access to social benefits, 
the new era sees integration as the main character. Treated exclusively as a requirement to citizenship 
rights, integration is a watershed between models of individuals. What is, in the broader play of the 
evolutionary nature of EU citizenship, the role for crime and criminals? Thanks to Dano and 
Alimanovic, we have familiarised with the unemployed. Crime is another important fictitious character 
in the story told by the Court. Crime is a monolithic category – so, one should say, violation of the law 
– to which lack of integration is associated. Here yet another character comes into play: the criminal. 
Lack of integration as disobedience to the law then places the perpetual temporary host into the 
anthropological category of the criminal. The default treatment reserved to the criminal is denial of 
citizenship rights. Since the criminal lacks integration, the only logical inference is taking reintegration 
out of the picture. There is another group of characters to be introduced. They are those particularly 
dangerous of criminals deserving yet a higher level of abstraction and presumption. The drug-dealer, 
the sexual offender, the terrorist are threats to public security; which threshold, as shown above, 
supports the adoption of particularly harmful measures.  
The following episodes highlight the absence of reintegration from the overall narration. This is a story 
of felonies, enemies, host and lack of integration. Against that background, there is no space for 
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inclusion and ‘collectively dealing with the wrong’: the wrongdoers are still their (other states’) 
wrongdoers. 
 
3.2. Shaping Criminal Law through Citizenship 
3.2.1. Withdrawing Acquired Rights: The Drug-Dealer  
Mr. Tsakouridis was born in Germany in 1978, where he was entitled to unlimited residence in 2001. 
He was arrested in Greece in 2006 and transferred to Germany, where he was sentenced to six years 
and six months imprisonment. According to German law, the conviction for certain offences would 
deprive the person of the right of entry and residence in Germany, the reason why he was delivered an 
expulsion order on ‘imperative grounds of public security’. As known, the Citizenship Directive allows 
expulsion: on serious grounds of public policy and public security, if the person has the right to 
permanent residence; on imperative grounds of public security, if the person has resided in the host state 
for the 10 years preceding the expulsion.  
The Court had to answer the question as to what absences from the host Member State during the 10-
yeras period prevent that person from enjoying the enhanced protection laid down in that provision. 
This is a crucial question, as it leads to the decision as to what level of protection to afford the person – 
serious or imperative grounds, the latter being clearly a much higher threshold to be met. Once decided 
on that point of law, the Court had to answer on the interpretation of the concept of imperative grounds 
of public security; and, more specifically, whether that concept could be covered by Mr Tsakouridis’ 
behaviour. On the former issue, the Court found that the forced return of the person to the host state due 
to the imposition of a custodial penalty and the time spent in prison ‘may be taken into account as part 
of the overall assessment required for determining whether the integrating links previously forged with 
the host Member State have been broken’.59 
Integration is - subtly but clearly - introduced as a condition to access enhanced protection against the 
expulsion. From the ‘overall assessment’ mentioned by the Court, nothing would lead to conclude that 
the person had transferred to Greece the centre of his personal interest. The focus become therefore the 
crime committed by Mr Tsakouridis; namely, dealing in narcotics as part of an organised group. The 
Court found that that behaviour is a diffuse form of crime with impressive economic and operational 
resources and frequently with transnational connections, as confirmed by the fact that the EU has 
adopted a specific legislative instrument.60 
A balance must be struck between the threat (considering the time of the expulsion decision,61 the 
possible penalties and sentences, the involvement in the criminal activity, the risk of reoffending62) and 
the risk of compromising the social rehabilitation of the Union citizen in the State in which he has 
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become genuinely integrated, which is not only in his interest but also in that of the European Union in 
general.63 When balancing these two interests, the national court must take into account the nature and 
seriousness of the offence committed, the duration of residence of the person concerned in the host 
Member State, the period which has passed since the offence was committed and the conduct of the 
person concerned during that period, and the solidity of the social, cultural and family ties with the host 
Member State.64 
The judgment helps familiarise with the plot written by the Court in the subsequent chapters on crime 
and citizenship. Integration is regarded – though incidentally and without detailed discussion – as a 
requirement to access citizenship rights. What is the role for crime in that assessment? The Court 
considers this through the lens of EU criminal law and the impressive consequences on social, 
economical point of view. The existence of a specific EU instrument (Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA) testifies to the importance of fighting a given criminal phenomenon; which, in turn, 
legitimates the adoption of restrictive measures on public security ground. The second step is a 
proportionality test en trompe-l’oœil. Firstly, the use of the rehabilitation argument is flanked by the 
introduction of a supra-individual understanding thereof. The example of the FD on the transfer of 
prisoners shows that a paternalistic approach to rehabilitation in the interest of the public can easily 
pave the way to significant restriction of the person’s rights. Secondly, the Court pays lip service to 
leaving room to the national judge. One the one hand, the national judge is provided with guidance on 
factors to be considered for the balance. On the other, and ultimately, that balance involves a crime that 
the Court explicitly defines – with no nuances whatsoever – as a serious, actual and imminent threat to 
public security. The Court seems to be leaving the national judge the choice on what level of protection 
to afford (second or third paragraph of Article 28). In reality, it is saying that protection is afforded on 
condition of integration, on which hangs a conduct that is covered by serious grounds of public security.  
The main topics of Tsakouridis are taken to a next level in P. I. Here, the CJEU completely removes 
reintegration from the agenda of EU citizenship, and further broadens the concept of public security 
through legitimation of EU criminal law. 
 
3.2.2. Stretching Public Security: The Rapist 
If Tsakouridis had seen some tentative references to the need for expulsion not to completely impair 
reintegration – though with a disturbing twist towards the protection of the public – P. I. further shifts 
the paradigm in the CJEU’s approach. Mr P. I.65 was born in Italy and had lived in Germany since 1987, 
where he was granted a residence permit. In 2006, he was sentenced to seven years and six months 
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imprisonment for sexual assault, sexual coercion and rape of a minor. In 2008, he lost the right to enter 
and reside in Germany, and was delivered an expulsion measure. 
On that ground, the Court was asked as to whether the “imperative grounds of public security” cover 
only threats posed to the internal and external security of the State in terms of the continued existence 
of the State with its institutions and important public services, the survival of the population, foreign 
relations and the peaceful co-existence of nations. As known, the Court answered that “it is open to the 
Member States to regard criminal offences such as those referred to in the second subparagraph of 
Article 83(1) TFEU as constituting a particularly serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of 
society, which might pose a direct threat to the calm and physical security of the population and thus 
be covered by the concept of ‘imperative grounds of public security’, capable of justifying an expulsion 
measure under Article 28(3) of Directive 2004/38, as long as the manner in which such offences were 
committed discloses particularly serious characteristics, which is a matter for the referring court to 
determine on the basis of an individual examination of the specific case before it”. 
The judgment has been subject to fierce criticism, with scholars highlighting the legal unsoundness of 
the decision from the perspective of EU citizenship law. In a very accurate assessment, Niamh Shuibhne 
found that P.I. “hands an extraordinary degree of expulsion power (back) to national authorities, [and] 
[i]t departs from the standard rights broadly/derogations narrowly paradigm that is especially vital in 
situations of expulsion. The revitalization of punishment-plus-banishment is difficult to square with the 
objective of rehabilitation, rooted in human dignity and committed to by the States yet it feeds a 
misplaced expectation that States can always exclude “bad” Union citizens – as if the intended 
strengthening of protection through the Directive had never happened”. 
In a decision where the final finding is more extended than – and not hugely connected to – the core of 
the reasoning, the Court bases the latter entirely on EU criminal law. Firstly, Article 83(1) TFEU 
considers the sexual exploitation of children as one of the areas of crime in which the EU may enact 
substantive criminal law.66 Secondly, the CJEU strengthened its reasoning by mentioning Directive 
2011/93/EU on the sexual abuse and exploitation of the children and the particularly high penalties 
provided therein, which reflects the objective established by primary law.67  
If in Tsakouridis the existence of EU criminal law instruments had been one of the criteria to support 
the presumption that drug trafficking is covered by serious grounds for public security, in P. I. it is the 
only argument used. In one breath, the Court distorts both the use of Articles 28 Citizenship Directive 
and 83(1) TFEU. As rightly noted by Mitsilegas, the latter provision ‘serves as a legal basis 
circumscribing the competence  of the  European Union to adopt legislation on criminal offences and 
sanctions, and not as a legal basis for interpreting exceptions to EU free movement and citizenship 
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rights’.68 The end result of this transplant is that ‘in terms of EU citizenship, it serves to dilute the 
protection offered by EU law; in terms of EU criminal law, by elevating the enumeration of the conduct 
listed in Article 83(1) to a ground justifying exceptions to rights granted under EU law, it affirms an 
uncritical securitised vision of EU criminal law and transforms Article 83(1) TFEU into symbolic 
criminal law’.69 
It is true that the Court seems to mitigate its conclusions, by finding that “This examination include the 
individual propensity to act in the same way in the future, the integration into that State and the extent 
of his/her links with the country of origin, any material change in the circumstances since the expulsion 
order was issued”.  
The reference to the individual propensity is striking, and seems to confirm the CJEU’s orientation 
toward the enemy – rather than the Duffian - side of the crime-citizenship spectrum. Reintegration 
comes into play precisely because there is some acknowledged tendency to re-offend by the person 
concerned, and the punishment needs to be structured so to reduce the likelihood of recidivism. Here, 
the individual propensity-test becomes a criterion to distinguish between citizens and enemies. In other 
words, a way to decide whether or not to continue a dialogue with the individual, or to move on to a 
strategy based on incapacitation and eradication of the source of disturbance. In the present case, 
expulsion from the host state. 
With reintegration left out of the horizon, Tsakouridis and P. I. strengthen the redefinition of crime and 
citizenship by broadening the concept of public security through the identification of dangerous 
offenders. This process has two main implications. Firstly, it continues the dynamic of abstraction and 
identification of anthropological categories while significantly reducing the room for individual 
assessment. We define the permanent host as welcome or not on the basis of his/her capacity for being 
a threat to the security of the state concerned. Secondly, this assessment revolves around a strong 
connection between citizenship and EU criminal law. Union’s competences under Article 83(1) TFEU 
are laid down through the same method (serious areas of crime constituting security threats), reason 
why that provision has been referred to as a legal basis for securitised criminalisation. What is more, 
primary and secondary EU criminal law in Tsakouridis and P. I. are used to legitimate the adoption of 
coercive measures under citizenship law. Or, as if one were looking in a mirror, coercive measures 
under citizenship law are used to strengthen the legitimacy of EU criminal law. The latter becomes an 
authoritative source to prove the seriousness of conducts capable of resulting in rights restriction. 
While the first two chapters of this story focused on two specific characters – the drug dealer and the 
rapist – next episode broadens our horizon, and introduces us another protagonist of this saga: the 
criminal. 
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3.2.3. Citizenship Rights and Criminal conducts: The Emergence of The Criminal 
While Onuekwere and M. G. apparently cover different points of law to those of Tsakouridis and P. I., 
they can be regarded as part of the same picture. As known, acquisition of permanent residence and 
enhanced protection against expulsion (allowing expulsion only on imperative grounds of public 
security) require five, and ten, years of residence in the host state, respectively.  
Onuekwere regarded a third-country national who applied for permanent residence in the UK, while 
being repeatedly jailed during the five-year period provided for in the Citizenship Directive. M. G. 
concerned a Portuguese national who had been living in the UK for over 10 years, before being 
imprisoned after conviction, and delivered an expulsion order on serious grounds of public security. 
These cases brought anew to the fore the uneasy relationship between crime, time and (legal) residence 
in EU citizenship. Can time in prison be taken into account as ‘qualified’ time to access permanent 
residence (Onuewkere) or enhanced protection (M. G.)? Does that time erase the precedent ‘good’ 
period of residence, so requiring the integration clock to start ticking again from scratch?  
The CJEU spells out what had been only hinted at in previous judgments. Firstly, the Court regarded 
integration as a precondition of the acquisition of the right to permanent residence and enhanced 
protection, based on territorial, temporal and qualitative elements.70 A prison sentence ensues from a 
violation, by the person concerned, of Member States’ criminal law, which in turn enshrines the societal 
values of that state.71 Thus, a conviction is in denial of genuine integration, and granting citizenship 
rights in spite of that circumstance would run counter to the aim of the Directive. If these rights require 
integration, the latter in turn is achieved through  continuity of legal residence.72 However, the intrinsic 
incompatibility between detention and integration means that prison time interrupts the continuity of 
residence,73 so precluding the access to citizenship rights.  
For someone that commits a crime and goes to prison, the integration clock stops ticking, and starts 
again when – maybe – the person is set at free.74 In M. G., the CJEU tentatively mitigated its harsh 
conclusions by stating that “the fact that the person concerned has resided in the host Member State 
during the 10 years prior to imprisonment may be taken into consideration as part of the overall 
assessment for determining whether the enhanced protection will be granted”.75 
The judgments strike for different reasons. After reinforcing the understanding of integration in EU 
citizenship as a requirement rather than objective, they generalise the equation between criminal 
behaviour and disregard for societal values. We are no longer dealing with specific categories of 
wrongdoer, such as the drug dealer or the rapist, but with the criminal tout court. The rulings seem to 
completely ignore the distinction between mala in se and mala quia probihita, according to which there 
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are – plenty of – offences that are quasi-administrative, precautionary in nature and very tenuously 
value-based. What is more, they reinforce a disturbing legal fictions based on two, inextricably linked, 
centrepieces: the sharp contrast between anthropological categories – the citizen v the criminal – and 
the denial of a proportionality test. This confirms the growing distance of the current CJEU’s approach 
from a Duffian understanding of punishment, and strengthens the use of EU citizenship as means to 
legitimate EU (criminal) law.  
When asked about the possibility of leaving some room to the national judge – as advocated by Germany 
and the Commission – the AG denied such a possibility: offences and penalties vary significantly 
throughout the Union, and ‘it is for the European Union legislature to define the criteria on the basis of 
which and the thresholds within which it should be considered that a period of residence in prison does 
not interrupt residence”.76 This argument - tacitly agreed with by the Court – adds centralisation of the 
relationship between crime and EU citizenship to the self-legitimation emerging from previous 
judgments. Not only the presence of existing primary and secondary EU criminal law is a valid – in P. 
I., the only – argument justifying incredibly serious restrictions of citizenship rights. It is for EU law to 
harmonise the conditions on which crime – and in particular prison time - can curb those rights. 
In balancing rehabilitation and retributive functions of custodial penalties, the AG in Onuekwere found 
that clearly ‘the sentence also serves the essential purpose of retribution’, and ‘rehabilitative function 
cannot result in a situation where a period spent atoning for the crime committed confers on the 
convicted person a right the acquisition of which requires recognition and acceptance of social values 
which he specifically disregarded by committing his criminal act’.77 Rehabilitation follows the 
imposition of a sentence, which in turn denies integration.  
It may seem only fair that no one shall be rewarded for committing a crime. If the person cannot acquire 
new rights because of imprisonment, however, what about rights already acquired? The answer given 
in M. G. is clear: any crime can result in denying integration link, and so in the withdrawal of rights 
(potentially) enjoyed by the person. One may object that this is reserved to those rights requiring 
acceptance of social value. If this is the case, the question spontaneously arises: where do we draw the 
line between rights that require acceptance of social values of those that do not?  
If crime and punishment stand in the way of further rights, and deprive the person of a (potentially) 
extremely broad range of rights already acquired, rehabilitation is required to work on a person with an 
extremely impoverished personal legal status. The likelihood of success, then, becomes very limited.  
In the last (for the moment) chapter of this story, the figures of the criminal and the EU national do not 
coincide. In Rendón Marín and C. S., the former (third-country national) has full custody of minor 
Union citizens.  
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3.2.4. Enjoying the Substance of Citizenship? Continuity beyond the Appearance 
Rendón Marín and C. S. regarded the possible expulsion from the Union of third-country nationals, 
having full custody of minor Union citizens. In Rendón Marín, the coercive measure would ensue from 
the person concerned being illegally staying in Spain, as he was refused the right to reside therein. This 
refusal was based on Spanish law, which automatically excludes the right to residence to those who 
have criminal record. As for C. S., the UK law provides that third-country nationals convicted for a 
criminal offence of a certain gravity (in this case, one year imprisonment) are automatically liable to 
deportation. The children would be subject to expulsion as well, as they are not autonomous.  
In both cases, the Court found that an expulsion could be compatible with EU law. However, that 
measure could not result solely from the criminal record of the person concerned. Articles 27 and 28 of 
the Citizenship Directive make clear that the personal conduct of the individual concerned must 
represent a genuine and present threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or of the 
Member State concerned.78 Therefore, an expulsion measure situations like those at stake has to be 
based on a specific assessment by the national court of all the current and relevant circumstances of the 
case,79 in the light of the principle of proportionality, of the child’s best interests80 and of the 
fundamental rights whose observance the Court ensures.81  
The Court’s rulings Rendón Marín and C. S. seems to mitigate the harsh stance taken in the previous 
decisions analysed above. This could be surely explained, amongst other factors, by the specific 
circumstances of the cases. Unlike other judgments, the refusal of the right to residence and protection 
against expulsion as consequence of criminal convictions could have led the persons concerned – and 
the Union citizens of whom the TCNs are fully in charge - to be deported outside the EU.  
On a closer look, the judgment shows a significant degree of continuity with the previous chapters of 
the saga. This can be seen specifically in the way the CJEU reconstructs the concept of public security. 
While declaring the need to interpret it narrowly, the Court confirms its previous, very debatable case-
law. By endorsing an understanding of public security built around the identification of dangerous 
categories of individual – the drug trafficker,82 the rapist, the terrorist83  – the CJEU brings even closer 
EU citizenship, and primary and secondary EU criminal law.  
The next section discusses the appropriateness, such differences notwithstanding, of jointly reading this 
case-law, where the Court adopted a reward-based approach to citizenship rights, conferred according 
to the divide between law-abiding citizens and threatening individuals.  
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At first sight, the Court’s approach might express an attempt at establishing commonality of values 
within the EU through criminal law. However, values might be means to the end of legitimating the use 
of EU criminal law. The Court turns upside down EU citizenship law, by counter-posing abstract 
anthropological models – the loyal citizen v the criminal – and using those models to reinvent the 
concept of public security. 
 
3.3. Criminals or Citizens? 
EU citizenship law – and Directive 2004/38/EC in particular – explicitly aim at promoting integration 
of citizens throughout the Union. The objective is achieved – also – by anchoring the adoption of 
potentially detrimental measures to a strict and individual assessment, based on the existence of an 
actual and present threat. Such a test is required by both public policy and public security exceptions. 
These concepts, in the traditional Court’s approach and the Citizenship Directive, are clearly kept 
separately, with public security requiring a much higher threshold to be met. This is especially the case 
when it comes to persons having legally resided in the host state for many years prior to the measure in 
question.   
The cases discussed above are difficult to square with such a legal framework, and mark a shift of 
paradigm in the Court’s approach to the relationship between crime and citizenship. What is more, they 
form part of a broader trend in EU citizenship. The Court tend increasingly to identify and oppose 
anthropological models of individuals divided by the line of the integration requirement. Once the crime 
becomes the watershed, the anthropological mutation – which amounts to a radical change of one’s 
legal status - from the law-abiding to the criminal is easy. 
The Court outlines and consolidates a model of probationary citizenship where rights – including the 
right not to be subject to coercive measures – are regarded as a reward. This approach rests on two, 
contrasting models of human being, and is underpinned by a never-ending expanding interpretation of 
public security. The departure from the individual assessment test starts with the depiction of one, 
monolithic figure of criminal, and continues through the construction of a concept of public security 
that now: incorporates that of public policy, so significantly watering down the different levels of 
protection laid down by the Directive; is construed through the identification of categories of threats.  
This process of abstraction is explicitly upheld by the AG in Onuekwere, where the possibility for a 
proportionality test at national level is sacrificed to the altar of the autonomy of the EU legislature. Once 
a person has committed a crime, s/he is attracted into a group where integration disappears from the 
horizon of the Directive’s objective, and only acts as a requirement for granting rights. Admittedly, 
Onuekwere – the case where the criminal clearly emerged – focussed on the calculation of prison time 
for acquiring permanent residence, and not on the adoption of coercive measures. However, that 
approach was confirmed in a case that did concern expulsion, such as M. G. Furthermore, the rulings 
show that the denial of the right of residence, both at national and Union level, may well lead to 
expulsion measures, so that the two issues cannot be dissociated. 
Consistently with recent case-law in other areas of EU citizenship (social assistance), one of the 
arguments used by the Court is that the Directive requires legal residence for achieving the rights at 
stake. Such legality would be denied by the commission of a crime. The reasoning is particularly 
problematic. With the strongly residence-based framework of EU citizenship law in mind, if we accept 
an equation between criminal behaviour and illegality of residence – and the further consequences 
stemming from that presumption - what might be questioned is the prohibition to ground restrictive 
measures merely on criminal record. For the time being, such a possibility has been ruled out by the 
Court in Rendón Marín and C. S. However, as explained below, the factual background from which the 
cases arose – and their immediate follow-up - seems not to allow for reassuring conclusions.     
Equally controversial is the capacity of criminal record to trigger the notion of threat. While the 
traditional approach is that the mere presence of the former should not be able to activate the latter – 
although, as shown, such a rule might not be as rock solid as it used to be – it is not clear whether a 
threat may be seen even without a criminal conviction. This is one of the key features of the enemy 
criminal law: ‘When a past act is punished […] one is still communicating with the criminal […] when 
it comes to the prevention of future acts, it is more a question of isolation’.84 The possibility of a 
disconnection between crime and threat emerges even from the classic case-law of the CJEU,85 and was 
confirmed by the New Settlement for the UK in the EU more recently.86  
The new wave of the Court’s approach to crime and citizenship, heavily relying on presumptions and 
ideal types, seems to espouse the refuse to engage in any sort of ‘dialogue’ with the criminal. On the 
basis of such presumption the Court seem to overlook the detrimental effects that these measures could 
have on the rehabilitation of the person concerned: you cannot achieve reintegration without integration 
first – denied per se by any criminal conduct. The tentative references to reintegration not only reveal 
the belief that wrongdoers are mostly a problem of their state of nationality – which somehow 
contradicts the very spirit of EU citizenship and the creation of the Union as a borderless area. Also, 
those references rest on an understanding of reintegration that – consistently with the EU law-wide 
approach – is mainly oriented to the protection of the public rather than individual rehabilitation. 
On the one hand, the Court is powerfully affirming a logic of the earned rights, allocated according to 
the level of faithfulness to the law. On the other, and as a typical feature of a probationary citizenship, 
such a status is used as a mean to reaffirm national security.87 Contrasting the law-abiding citizen to the 
criminal is accompanied by the demands for protection of the former class of individuals and the public 
more in general, as well as by war declarations against serious areas of crime (most commonly drugs, 
sexual offenses, and terrorism). A strong link emerges from these cases and EU criminal law. The 
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‘serious areas of crime’ approach is present in the Union law and policy,88 where institutional documents 
and law refer to the need for fighting specifically identified major crime threats.89 This interaction is 
embodied by the Court’s use of Article 83(1) TFEU. The legal basis for the Union exercise of 
competences in substantive criminal law – and secondary law instrument adopted pursuant to that 
provision – is an authoritative argument to legitimate the adoption of rights restriction. Or, from a 
different angle, citizenship rules on rights restrictions are used to legitimate EU criminal law – and EU 
competences more in general. Such dynamic finds mature completion in Onuekwere, where the AG 
refused the proportionality test, as it is for the Union legislature to determine the relationship between 
crime and citizenship. This argument comes with a caveat. This legitimation process does not imply the 
will to build a true Union approach: the FD on the transfer of prisoner shows that in this area EU law 
measures can be – and are – adopted with the states’ security interests in mind. 
It is true that the Rendón Marín and C. S. judgments seem to set a very high threshold for expelling the 
persons concerned from the EU as a consequence of criminal convictions. However, the Court has not 
abandoned an understanding of public policy and public security that, apart from keeping the boundaries 
between these two concepts rather blurred, is constructed through the categorisation of major categories 
of dangerous individuals. Terrorists, drug traffickers, child abusers are threats to state security. They 
are individuals worth being excluded from the community (be it the state or the Union).  
Admittedly, Rendón Marín and C. S. should be distinguished by Tsakouridis, P.I., Onuekwere and M. 
G. in that they: constitute examples of static cases - like Ruiz Zambrano, there is no cross-border 
element at play; would imply expulsion from the Union altogether of EU citizens for acts they have not 
committed.  
The Court might have been adopted a stance more leaning towards the protection of individual rights, 
by almost completely setting aside the possibility of expulsion merely on the basis of criminal record.  
However, the rulings, in one breath, state the need for a restrictive interpretation of public policy and 
public security, and confirm (especially in C. S.) the broader understanding of those concepts – 
established through the judgments discussed above. In the current EU law approach the criminal, there 
is always room for measures aimed to eradicating sources of disturbances. 
The use of a Union territory-based argument should not be mistaken for an allusion to a form of value 
commonality in Europe. The Court is simply establishing a higher threshold for an undeniably more 
harmful situation: the expulsion from the EU involving minor Union citizens who are atoning for 
someone else’s misbehaviour.  
The threats in these cases are only the bearers of derived rights, even though the fate of the primary 
beneficiaries (the children) and the derived ones (the enemies) are inextricably linked. Allowing for an 
outcome such as that of the infra-EU case-law would have meant extending the good citizen test to 
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persons who have: entitlement to a higher standard of protection, as are Union citizens compared to 
non-EU family members; not been involved in any cross-border situations, with the consequences that 
they would be under scrutiny in their own state. 
The CJEU, when referring to values, mostly refers to the values of the host Member State. The 
overriding concern hereby addressed is the state power to get rid of the deviant, independently of his/her 
status of EU citizen. To this end, there is no clue in the Court’s words of the dealing ‘collectively with 
the wrong’, the preserving - rather than denying - the offender’s civic standing. The wrongdoers are not 
‘our wrongdoers’, but sources of disturbance that have to be done away with. 
Member States are granted significant leeway, in order to physically remove a dangerous individual 
from their national communities. Rendón Marín and C. S. stated that, when minor EU citizens are 
involved, the person fully in charge of their custody can be expelled from the Union only in exceptional 
circumstances. Therefore, states do can expel EU citizens from the Union whenever the crimes covered 
by the Court’s case-law are at stake.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
EU citizenship law has been built on the right, for Member States’ nationals, to move and reside freely 
across the Union. These freedoms – and other, associated substantive rights - are balanced, in primary 
and secondary law, by limits and conditions. While the reach and nature of these limits and conditions 
have not been always crystal-clear, a trend has emerged over recent years where criminal conducts are 
key to both these concepts.  
Starting with the Tsakouridis judgment, the Court seems to have drawn a line between a prior approach 
to crime and citizenship rights, more favourable to the person concerned, to a subsequent, restrictive 
and (apparently) value-based one. To analyse and locate the CJEU’s approach, the article has used a 
crime-citizenship spectrum at which ends Duff’s, and Jakobs’, accounts of punishment – hereby 
understood in its broader sense - have been placed. On the one hand, the Duff’s approach advocates for 
a criminal law built upon an inclusive understanding of community and citizenship, and includes 
reformation of the wrongdoer in the purposes of punishment. On the other, Jakobs’ theory distinguishes 
between the citizen and the enemy: while the former is still in a dialogue with the community and 
‘deserves’ the application of ordinary criminal law, the latter is a threatening individual (not a person 
recognised by the legal order anymore) requiring pure incapacitation. 
While this research does equate the Court’s stance with the criminal of the enemy, it showed that the 
CJEU’s approach: is built upon a strong presumptive mechanism, critically embodied by the dichotomy 
citizen-criminal; disregards the detrimental effect of the measures at stake on the reintegration of the 
person concerned, while espousing a logic where public security demands are the polar star; for the 
foregoing reasons, blatantly contradicts EU citizenship law, both as positivized and traditionally 
interpreted by the Luxembourg judges.  
Upon understanding integration as a condition for acquisition of rights, crime as such would deny that 
condition: violations of criminal law would amount to disregard for the societal values of the host 
Member State, and stand in the way of granting rights to the wrongdoers. In most cases, such an 
interpretation has been underpinned by equating the criminal to a threat to public security. These rulings 
might appear as expression of a communitarian approach to criminal law: the morals-centred 
argumentative pattern used by the Court would serve the purpose of strengthening citizenship through 
criminal law.  
Fascinating as the idea can be, this article has argued that the EU is developing a model of probationary 
citizenship, where obedience and loyalty to the law are a key criterion to distinguishing between the 
good and the bad citizen, and to allocating rights according to that distinction. The opposition of the 
law-abiding citizen against the criminal materialises in the judgements discussed above. However, the 
saga on crime and rights should be read in the context of the broader Court’s shift on EU citizenship. 
The case-law on equal access to social benefits shows that the unemployed without sufficient resources 
is potentially liable to coercive measures as well, since his/her non-compliance with the conditions laid 
down in the Citizenship Directive deprives him/her of the right to reside in the host state. 
In the Court’s case-law, the main concern seems to be the protection of the former category – embodied 
by a broad interpretation of the concept of public security, often merged with that of public policy – 
from the latter, by mainly construing the wrongdoer as a threat.  
The rulings analysed in this research cover a broad spectrum of situations: Tsakouridis and P. I. concern 
protection against expulsion of an EU citizen within the Union; Onuekwere and M. G. revolve around 
the possibility to consider prison time for the purposes of acquiring the right to permanent residence 
and protection against expulsion; Rendón Marín and C. S. deal with the expulsion of third-country 
nationals having full custody of minor, non-autonomous EU citizens from the Union altogether.  
Such differences should not however be overestimated. Each of these decisions is part and parcel of a 
broader, coherent picture that is the current state of the art of the relationship between crime and 
citizenship rights in EU law. Firstly, the Court establishes an automatism between crime and rights 
denial, on the basis of the monolithic categories of the crime and the criminal. This move is explicit in 
Onuekwere and M. G.  
Secondly, and building upon that, an ever-expanding concept of public security is crafted through the 
categorisation of major, threatening individuals: the drug dealer, the terrorist, the child abuser. Thereby, 
not only the Court is pointing to those groups allowing exceptional, rights-curtailing measures. It is also 
self-legitimating the EU powers in criminal matters at any levels, taking the shape of: existing primary 
and secondary law (Articles 83(1) TFEU and instruments against drug trafficking and sexual 
exploitation of children), as in Tsakouridis and P. I.; appeal to the Union legislature to decide on the 
way in which crime can impact on citizenship rights, as the AG did in Onuekwere; Court’s rulings, 
crystallising its own approach, as apparent in Rendón Marín and C. S. 
It is true that the outcome of these two judgments was favourable to the persons concerned. However, 
in its reasoning the CJEU kept upholding its expansive approach to public security (although formally 
arguing for the need to a strict interpretation thereof). For this reason, the way in which Rendón Marín 
and C. S. will deserve special attention.  
As an immediate follow-up, the Opinion of the AG in the Fahimian case states that ‘The term public 
security is referred to in the context of all internal market freedoms, including in Directive 2004/38/EC, 
which specifies the rules on free movement and on citizenship in the context of free movement, as a 
ground of justification for a derogation from free movement. Moreover, the Court has recently allowed 
for a public security exception in the context of the Treaty rules on EU citizenship, by holding in CS that 
Article 20 TFEU does not affect the possibility of Member States relying on an exception linked, in 
particular, to upholding the requirements of public policy and safeguarding public security’.90 
At first sight, such a reading of C. S. seems to follow the – not very promising – direction depicted in 
this article, whereby the Court’s case-law is used as a tool to confirm, rather than restrict, state coercive 
powers. 
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